

Page Denied

TOP SECRET

25X1

14 August 1959
Copy 4 of 14

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman of GMAIC

SUBJECT: Report of Operational Site Team

1. Statement of Mission:

The Operational Site Team was given the mission of reviewing the latest material available to determine whether it necessitated any revisions in NIE 11-5-59 relative to operational sites for surface-to-surface missiles.

2. Conclusions:

- a. With the exception of Tyura Tam, no launch sites for surface-to-surface missiles were found in the overflight photography and therefore no revisions are recommended in NIE 11-5-59.
- b. Those intelligence reports of operational sites subject to check within the covered area have been negated.
- c. Coverage of the Ural rail lines, at about 25% of the total rail area, is insufficient to enable a valid conclusion that there are no ICBM sites in the area.
- d. Relative to missiles launched from the 650 NM impact area, no missile launch facilities were found in this area.
- e. The new launch pad at Tyura Tam appears to be an extension of research and development and/or the space vehicle program.

3. Extent of Coverage:

From an operational launch site consideration, interest was centered primarily along rail served areas of the Urals, but all other areas were also checked. [redacted] covered approximately one-third of the rail served area

25X1

in the Urals, and about one-third of this coverage was obscured by clouds. From a point about 30 NM south of Tyura Tam to Kozhabul the area was practically cloud free, with only a few clouds scattered along flight path. However, scattered and heavy clouds were encountered at about 50° 15'N-60° 00'E. This condition persisted along the route to about 15NM south of Zlatoust, where heavy clouds and overcast prevailed to about 10NM north of Magnitogorsk. There were scattered

TOP SECRET

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

clouds from Magnitogorsk to about 50° 50'N - 58° 30'E. From this point to the Aral Sea, overcast and heavy clouds predominated.

4. Methodology

In order to assure maximum exploitation of the photo coverage, the following approach was used:

- a. A thorough PI search and analysis was requested of those suspect locations within the coverage of the overflight but developed from other sources of intelligence.
- b. All the photography was screened to determine additional areas of interest which were then subjected to analysis. Special emphasis was placed on areas which were rail or highway served, and those areas in the vicinity of AE facilities or within the defense sector of the newly discovered SAMs.
- c. The PI reports relative to areas of interest were checked against a list of indicators to determine possible missile associations. It is recognized that individually these may not necessarily be valid as regards Soviet operational sites but collectively are probably indicative of missile facilities. The factors considered as indicators are:
 - (1) Security measures
 - (2) Configuration, dispersion, isolation
 - (3) Operational hardware and facilities
 - (a) launch pads
 - (b) missiles and/or missile handling and transporting equipment
 - (c) electronic gear
 - (d) unusual rail or road vehicles
 - (4) Support facilities
 - (a) LOX and fuel tanks
 - (b) rail and/or highway system
 - (c) receiving, inspection and maintenance facilities
 - (d) warhead storage or processing
 - (e) administrative and personnel facilities

TOP SECRET

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

5. Areas of Special Interest

Areas of special interest which were investigated from an operational site standpoint are as follows:

<u>Areas</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Nizhnyaya Salda }	This area contains numerous mines and logging operations.
Verkhnyaya Salda)	An unidentified raw material processing plant is under construction 8 NM northeast of Nizhnyaya Salda. This general area has been reported to contain a missile launch site.
Kasli	This region contains three road served, well dispersed areas which are cleared and mounded. Although not believed to be missile associated, the purpose of these areas has not been determined inasmuch as cloud cover in the area precludes survey of associated support facilities.
Nizhnyaya Tura	This area has a large installation believed to be AE associated. Several tear-drop shaped excavations in the area were examined but are believed to be associated with nuclear storage. The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee is presently convening a group of outside consultants to study this facility. No missile associations were noted by the Oper. Site Team.
Aralsk-Chelkar	Several 350 NM ballistic surface-to-surface missiles are known to have been launched from this area. No launch sites are in evidence on the photography. However, the terrain is such that cross country movements by mechanized units are feasible.
Tyura Tam	There is no evidence to indicate an operational type launch facility (prototype). The existing launch pad could be used for emergency operational purposes, and the new pad under construction appears to be basically the same.

6. Recommendations

- a. Failure to identify an operational launch site or any associated equipment in the area covered indicates a need to re-examine the parameters used to designate the Urals as an area in which the Soviet ICBMs would most likely be located.
- b. Recovery of the Ural area should be deferred pending completion of the re-evaluation in recommendation "a".
- c. Considering the likelihood of recurrent interest in these areas, factual PI reports should be published on the following "reported" missile facilities:

TOP SECRET

25X1


TOP SECRET

25X1

(1) Nizhnyaya Salda


(2) Kasli

- d. No special problem areas requiring the services of outside consultants have been encountered to date.
- e. It is recommended that the search for operational sites be continued under the cognizance of individual intelligence components.



25X1

Enclosure:
Tab (Questions and answers)



25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

TAB: Questions and Answers

Inasmuch as many of the questions posed by the Test Range and Production Teams had a direct bearing on the conclusions reached by the Operational Site Team, it is suggested that many pertinent questions and answers will be found in their papers.

Q. 1. Study the following areas for possible ICBM sites:

- a. Nizhnyaya Salda
- b. Vorkhnyaya Salda
- c. Nizhny Tagil
- d. Kasli
- e. Sverdlovsk (Maly Istok)
- f. Nizhnyaya Tura
- g. Possible operation site in and around 650 NM impact area

A. The above areas have been searched for ICBM activity by various PIs including the MCS Team. The CIA Collection Guide was used for reference. Unidentified industries, roads, railspurs and unusual construction have been noted. No ICBM activity was indicated. However, it should be noted, that it would take at least 6 months to completely search the above areas for all/or any indications of ICBM production activity.

Q. 2. Search area immediately east of Aralsk Sea for presence of launch site.

Determine whether area is suitable for rail or road launch equipment.
Compare with old run in '57 photography for differences.

A. Did not check this area against 1957 photo - 1959 photos of this area are mostly obliques and the small scale precludes detailed P. I. However this area has been viewed by several PIs. No indications of ICBM activity were noted. This area will support tracked vehicles and

TOP SECRET

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

could be used for launch equipment. This area will again be searched in conjunction with the 650 area KY. project with hopes of finding some indications of GM activity such as craters, instrumentation facilities.

Q. 3. Determine amount of coverage of rail lines and suspect areas. Which one of the following in the clear; partial coverage; completely cloud covered. Express in percentages.

A. All rail and roads that were visible on [redacted] were searched for indications of ICBM activity. Approx. 5130N to just south of Sverdlovsk was partly covered by clouds and from Kusa south to Magnitogorsk was covered by scattered to heavy clouds. A verbal brief as to the extent of cloud cover was given to [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Q. 4. Can we have view graphs prepared for GNAIC briefing on 12 Aug.?

Areas desired: three clearings at Kasli, Area 9 at Nizhnyaya Tura, general Ural area showing areas.

A. Yes. These view graphs are being prepared and should be completed by 11 Aug. 59.

Q. 5. Is there coverage of ZIATOUST (5510N - 5940E)? If so, search area for suspected sites.

Yes, there is coverage of ZIATOUST and it has been searched for ICBM activity. No indications of ICBM activity were noted as of this date.

Q. 6. Can a prospective drawing of Nizhnyaya Salda area be made?

A. A perspective drawing of Nizhnyaya Salda has been made and is in the lab for reproduction.

TOP SECRET

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

Q. 7. Dimensions are desired relative to Kasli crescent shaped mounds.

A. Kasli crescent shaped mounds:

Opening of Mound 70'

Width of roadways 18' - 20' (surfaced width)

Distance between sites - Approx. 6000' + 500' (about 1 mile)

Ht. of mound est. 25'

Overall size of mound 90' x 30'

Q. 8. Study the areas within the configuration of SAM sites to determine any evidence of ICBM sites.

A. Nineteen (19) SAM site areas were studied for evidence of ICBM activity.

No indications of this type of activity were observed.

Pertinent material: Artist's impression of typical site

Photo transparency of 2 of the sites

Map of Urals

TOP SECRET

25X1